Mohammed EL Kadiri

I am a Linux Kernel / Systems Software Engineer focused on kernel hardening, memory safety, and low-level C/C++ reliability.

I currently work on safety-critical embedded systems software and contribute publicly to the Linux kernel, with a focus on security-sensitive kernel objects, allocator hardening, parser robustness, and defensive kernel engineering.

Technical focus

Linux kernel hardening
Linux credentials and struct cred
Linux keyrings and struct key
Slab allocator behavior and cache isolation
SLAB_NO_MERGE for security-sensitive objects
Replacing unsafe BUG() paths with recoverable error handling
Parser robustness in kernel drivers
Flexible array hardening with __counted_by
KASAN, KFENCE, UBSAN, and kernel debugging
Low-level C/C++, POSIX, concurrency, and safety-critical software

Selected public work

Current direction

I am building a focused public body of work around Linux kernel security hardening through upstream contributions, high-quality technical writing, practical kernel-hardening labs, short technical videos, and low-level systems projects.

My long-term goal is to work with strong Linux kernel teams on kernel development, kernel hardening, memory safety, and security-sensitive systems.

Mohammed EL Kadiri

Linux Kernel / Systems Software Engineer focused on kernel hardening, memory safety, security-sensitive kernel objects, and low-level C/C++ reliability.

A Small RAII Wrapper for POSIX File Descriptors in C++17

Status: draft in progress Overview This article explains the design of a small RAII wrapper for POSIX file descriptors in C++17. A file descriptor is only an integer in userspace, but it refers to kernel-managed state. Treating it as a plain integer makes ownership easy to lose track of. The wrapper is meant to make descriptor ownership explicit and harder to misuse. Bugs this tries to avoid The article discusses common descriptor-management bugs: ...

Type Isolation in Kernel Allocators: Linux SLUB vs XNU Zones

Status: draft in progress Overview This article compares two allocator designs: Linux SLUB, which can merge compatible caches of similar-sized objects. XNU zones, which keep allocation domains separated by zone. The article is not meant to argue that one design is simply better than the other. The goal is to understand the tradeoff. SLUB’s cache merging can reduce memory overhead and allocator complexity. XNU’s zone isolation gives stronger type separation. Both choices make sense in context, and both have security and engineering consequences. ...

Mohammed EL Kadiri#

Technical focus#

Selected public work#

Current direction#

Mohammed EL Kadiri

Technical focus

Selected public work

Current direction